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A NOTE ON MAYO FOUNDATION FOR MEDICAL EDUCATION AND 






The beauty and appeal of obtaining a patent lies in the right 
to use a specific invention for a 20-year period after issuance.1 The 
clock begins ticking from the filing date of the application.2 
However, much of the 20-year term is consumed during the 
prosecution of a patent: the time between filing a patent application 
and receiving approval from the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”).3 Patent prosecution can be a 
burdensomely, time-consuming process that averages 
approximately 23.8 months—just shy of two years.4 
 
Delays in prosecution of a patent effectively reduce the 
enforceable term of the patent by eating away at the 20-year 
exclusivity term.5 As a solution to this disparity, the USPTO 
adopted the Patent Term Adjustment (“PTA”).6 The PTA 
compensates an applicant for “lost time” by extending the life of the 
patent on a day-by-day basis, adding one day to the end of the 
patent’s life span for each day delayed by the USPTO during 
 
* Florence Montarmani is a 2020 DePaul University College of Law J.D. 
Candidate. Florence graduated from the  Bowling Green State University in 2016, 
where she majored in Biology and minored in Chemistry. Florence also received 
her MBA from Bowling Green State University in 2017. As a law student, 
Florence has focused her efforts on Patent Law, receiving a CALI Excellence for 
the Future Award for the study of Patent Law, as well as the Robert and Clytia 
Chambers Scholarship Award for the study of Patent Law.  
1 Department of Commerce Patent and Trademark Office, 37 C.F.R. Parts 1 and 
3 Changes to Implement 20 Year Patent Term and Provisional Applications, 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/con/files/cons096.htm 
2 Id. 
3 Westlaw Practical Law: Patent Application Prosecution Overview. 
4 IP Spotlight: How long does it take to get a patent or trademark? (2018 
Update) (Jan 11, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/how-long-does-it-
take-to-get-a-patent-21821/  
5 Dale Fresh, Scott Harper, 2019 TXCLE-AIP 6-V: Patent Term Adjustment  
6 Id. 
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prosecution.7 The idea of the USPTO repaying lost time seems 
simple. But there are several concepts that complicate how much 
time will be allotted to an applicant. 
 
Part II of this case note will focus on the historical reasoning 
behind Patent Term Adjustments and how to calculate different 
types of delays.8 Part II will further explain applicant interferences 
with PTAs and the idea behind double patenting laws.9 Part III will 
focus on the central case for this note, Mayo Foundation for 
Medication Education and Research v. Iancu.10   Part IV will 
analyze the majority’s holding and dissent’s argument and discuss 
which application of the law was correct.11 Part V will discuss the 
implications the holding of Mayo Foundation has on future patent 
applications and how patent term adjustments and extensions relate 
to double patenting.12 Part VI will summarize why this case topic is 




The idea of a patent term adjustment was conceived by 
Congress in 1994.14 Enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act (URAA) led Congress to extend the life of a patent from 17 
years, beginning on the effective date of issuance, to twenty years 
from the date of filing.15 The patent term was extended to 
compensate for delays in patent prosecution that occur between the 
filing of an application and the date of the final issuance.16 Five 
years later, in 1999, Congress expanded the terms of the PTA by 
 
7 Perkins Coie, LLP. What is Patent Term Adjustment and Why Does It Matter? 
(June 30, 2014) 
8 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
14 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
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The premise behind this note begins with the issue of patent 
term adjustments as laid out in the case of Mayo Foundation for 
Medical Education and Research v. Iancu.19 Although it seems like 
a simple concept, the effects of decisions made by the Federal 
Circuit in cases such as Mayo Foundation, and several others in 
recent years will have major implications on a larger area of patent 
law known as double patenting.20 In order to understand the 
relationship, it is important to grasp the concepts individually:  
 
A. Patent Term Adjustment 
 
The foundation of Patent Term Adjustments is laid out in 
section 154(b) of the Patent Act.21 The Act provides three different 
circumstances where a patent may be granted an extension of the 
 
17 Id. 
18 Timeline shows history of patents as they have evolved into having a 20-year 
term. Legal Advantage, A Practical Approach to Calculating Patent Term 
Adjustment (PTA) (Oct. 17, 2018) https://www.legaladvantage.net/blog/a-
practical-approach-to-calculate-patent-term-adjustment-pta/  
19 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
20 Janice Mueller, Aspen Student Treatise Series: Patent Law (5th Edition, 2016) 
“Double patenting is often charged against pharmaceutical firms allegedly 
engaged in ‘ever-greening,’ that is, obtaining a series of patents on closely 
related drug inventions in an attempt to improperly prolong the patent life of the 
firm’s products.” 
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patent term, referred to as “delays.”22 The USPTO has categorized 
the three kinds of delays where an applicant may be entitled to an 
adjustment: A delay, B delay, and C delay.23  
 
35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(A) describes an A delay.24 This type 
of delay lies in the idea that the USPTO should give prompt 
responses. Specifically, an A delay is appropriate when: 
 
(i) the USPTO fails to issue a notice, i.e., mail a 
restriction requirement, a non-final office action, or a 
notice of allowance, within 14 months after the 
application filing date 
(ii) the USPTO fails to respond to an applicant’s Reply 
within 4 months 
(iii) the USPTO fails to respond to a Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (PTAB) decision within 4 months 
(iv) the USPTO fails to issue a patent within 4 months 
after issue fee has been paid.25 
 
For an A delay, the patent term is extended by one day for each day 
after the end of each specified period in the statute.26 
 
35 U.S.C §154(b)(1)(B) explains a B delay as proper where 
the USPTO fails to issue a patent within 3 years from its filing 
date.27 B delays exclude time consumed by requests for continued 
examination (“RCE”) and, appeals or interferences.28 
 
Finally, 35 U.S.C. §154(b)(1)(C) states C delays provide 
adjustment for interferences, secrecy orders, and appeals.29 An 
 
22 Christina Sperry, Elissa M. Kingsland, Patent Term Adjustment: The Real 
Meaning of Applicant Delay (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.mintz.com/insights-
center/viewpoints/2231/2019-02-patent-term-adjustment-real-meaning-
applicant-delay  
23 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1) 
24 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(A). 
25 Id. 
26 Id.  
27 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B). 
28 Id. 
29 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(C). 
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appeal can be contributed in a C delay only if it is successful.30 An 
unsuccessful appeal terminates the “B” clock.31  
 
The total amount of delay time is calculated by adding each 
type of delay together, where appropriate, and subtracting any 
overlap between the A and B delays.32 Further reductions in delay 
time apply where an applicant fails to “engage in reasonable efforts 
to conclude prosecution of the application.”33 These types of 
circumstances can occur when an applicant requires additional time 
beyond the expected 3 months to respond to an office action, filing 
non-responsive replies, or perhaps when an applicant submits 
supplemental replies and documents which are not expressly 
requested by the patent examiner.34  
 
PTA = (PTO Delay A + PTO Delay B + PTO Delay C – 
Overlap – Applicant’s delay), where PTA>=035 
 
B. Requests for Continued Examinations Pertaining to B Delays 
 
The central issue of this note and Mayo Foundation 
concerns the calculation of B Delays due to an RCE.36 An RCE 
allows for continued examination even after the patent examiner has 
issued an applicant a final rejection.37 The premise behind an RCE 




32 Norris McLaughlin, Calculating Patent Term Adjustment (PTA)—An 




34 Id.  
35 Legal Advantage, A Practical Approach to Calculating Patent Term 
Adjustment (PTA) (Oct. 17, 2018) https://www.legaladvantage.net/blog/a-
practical-approach-to-calculate-patent-term-adjustment-pta/ 
36 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
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and go through the steps of prosecution again.38 The seminal case 
of Novartis AG v. Lee, held that once an RCE has been filed, there 
is no B delay available for any time during the continued 
examination.39 If an RCE was filed during prosecution of an 
application, applicants are entitled to B delays for the time period 
between allowance and issuance.40  
 
C. Double Patenting 
 
Double patenting prevents the issuance of more than one 
patent on a claimed invention.41 There are two types of double 
patenting issues that the USPTO recognizes: (1) same-invention 
type and (2) obviousness-type (“OTDP”).42 Same-invention type 
double patenting is a statutory concept stemming from 35 U.S.C. § 
101, which states that an inventor “may obtain a patent.”43 On the 
contrary, OTDP is a non-statutory concept, which occurs when an 
applicant attempts to claim an invention that is an obvious variant 
of the original patent.44 Thus, the purpose behind rejecting double 
patents is to prevent a patentee from extending their patent 
monopoly beyond the statutorily prescribed term.45 
 
Although two separate concepts, OTDP and PTAs can 
become entangled. A prevalent issue arises when two patents share 
a common priority date because one was filed as a continuation of 
the other but happen to have different expiration dates due to the 
PTA.46 Recent holdings such as Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures, LLC. 
and Mayo Foundation will affect the future of patent terms and 
overcoming double patenting rejections.47 
 
38 Id. 
39 Novartis AG v. Lee, 740 F.3d 593 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
40 Id.  




44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Arpita Bchattcharyya, Timothy McAnulty, CIPA Journal US Update: Double 
Patenting (May 2019). 
47 Id.  
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III. MAYO FOUNDATION FOR MEDICAL EDUCATION 
AND RESEARCH V. IANCU 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Plaintiff, Mayo, is a Minnesota non-profit corporation and 
owner of United States Patent No. 8,981,063 (‘063 patent).48 The 
‘063 patent is related to antibodies that bind to polypeptides, which 
are useful in treating immunosuppression disease conditions such as 
cancer, AIDS and other virally or environmentally-induced 
conditions, and even certain congenital immune deficiencies.49 
Mayo filed Application No. 12/421,310 (‘310 application) on April 
9, 2009.50 The ‘063 patent was issued from the ‘310 application.51 
But on October 14, 2010 the USPTO issued a final office action 
rejecting all of the claims in the ‘310 application as anticipated by 
U.S. Patent No. 7,635,757 (‘757 patent), and a few claims for 
lacking written description.52 Come September 14, 2011, Mayo 
filed an RCE pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 132(b),53 arguing that its 
application had priority of invention over the ‘757 patent.54 Mayo 
also filed a supplemental amendment that cancelled some claims 
which the examiner had noted should be removed as to not interfere 
in upcoming PTA calculations.55 Mayo thus cancelled the claims 
and pursued them in a continuation application, issued as U.S. 
Patent 8,460,927 (‘927 patent).56  
 
 
48 Mayo Clinic Found. v. Iancu, 309 F.Supp. 3d 425 (E.D. Va. 2018). 
49 Mayo Clinic Found. v. Iancu, 309 F.Supp. 3d 430 (E.D. Va. 2018). 
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id. 
53 35 U.S.C. § 132(b). Notice of Rejection; Reexamination  
“The Director shall prescribe regulations to provide for the continued 
examination of applications for patent at the request of the applicant. The 
Director may establish appropriate fees for such continued examination and 
shall provide a 50 percent reduction in such fees for small entities that qualify 
for reduced fees under section 41(h)(1).” 
54 Mayo Clinic Found. v. Iancu, 309 F.Supp. 3d 430 (E.D. Va. 2018). 
55 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
56 Id. 
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On February 9, 2012, the Administrative Patent Judge 
issued a declaration of interference57 between the remaining claims 
of the ‘310 application and all of the claims in the ‘757 patent.58 
Finally, two years later on February 19, 2014, the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (“PTAB”) awarded the ‘310 application claims 
priority and cancelled all of the claims contained in the ‘757 
patent.59 The interference was considered final when the period for 
appeal expired on April 23, 2014.60  
 
After the termination of interference, the examiner 
conducted a further prior art search of the ‘310 application, which 
led to the issuance of an Office Action on June 30, 2014 that rejected 
some claims in the application on grounds of non-statutory 
obviousness-type double patenting, in light of the ‘927 patent.61 The 
rejections contended that the ’927 patent contained claims that had 
been cancelled in the ‘310 application.62 On October 24, 2014, 
Mayo filed a reply to the examiner, arguing that the claims 
contained in the ‘310 application were patentably distinct from the 
ones in the ‘927 patent.63 A notice of allowance was then mailed on 
November 3, 2014 and finally the ‘310 application was issued as the 
‘063 patent on March 17, 2015.64  
 
The following timeline65 provided by Mayo sets forth the 
dates and prosecution history described above:  
 
57 According to the USPTO “An interference is declared to assist the Director of 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office in determining priority, that is, 
which party first invented the commonly claimed invention within the meaning 
of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g)(1).” 
MPEP § 2301.03 reads: 
“An interference exists if the subject matter of a claim of one party would, if 
prior art, have anticipated or rendered obvious the subject matter of a claim of 
the opposing party and vice versa.”  
58 Mayo Clinic Found. v. Iancu, 309 F.Supp. 3d 430 (E.D. Va. 2018). 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Mayo Clinic Found. v. Iancu, 309 F.Supp. 3d 430 (E.D. Va. 2018). 
65 Photo indicates prosecution timeframe for the ‘310 application and ‘063 
patent 
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Calculation of the Patent Term Adjustment: 
 
Following the issuance of the ‘063 patent, the USPTO had to 
calculate the number of PTA days allotted to Mayo.66 Although the 
PTO found both A and C delays, it ultimately determined no B 
delays attributable to Mayo.67 The PTO calculated a total of 62168 
days of PTA, where Mayo’s calculation reflected 685 days.69 
Mayo’s calculation included the PTO’s reopening of prosecution 
after the termination of interference.70 This is where the 
disagreement at suit stemmed. The PTO asserted that continued 
examination time did not end at termination of interference, but 
rather at the mailing of the Notice of Allowance.71  
 
Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 27771, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
66 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
67 Id.  
68 Footnote 1 in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 
2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27771, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) indicates: “Both 
Mayo and the PTO have since change their PTA calculations...Mayo now 
claims 723 days, while the PTO has finally determined the Mayo is due 604 
days.”  
 
*Hereinafter, this note will refer to the new PTA calculations.* 
69 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
70 Id at *7-8. 
71 Id at *8. 
9
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The PTA calculation dispute resulted in Mayo filing for appeal to 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia.72 The district court ultimately upheld the PTO’s patent 
term adjustment determination.73 Mayo then appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.74 On September 16, 
2019, the Federal Circuit affirmed the USPTO and district court’s 
determination for the length of PTA allotted to Mayo.75   
 
B. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 
2019 Opinion 
 
The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in favor of the 
nonmovant.76 The Federal Circuit determined that it must set aside 
a PTO action only if the decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or “in excess 
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right.”77 The issue on appeal was one of statutory 
interpretation, and therefore was also reviewed de novo.78  
 
i. Statutory interpretation: “request” for examination 
 
On appeal, Mayo set forth its argument based 35 U.S.C. § 
154(b)(1)(B)(i), which defines PTA as: 
 
(B) Guarantee of no more than 3-year application 
pendency.—Subject to the limitations under paragraph 
(2), if the issue of an original patent is delayed due to the 
failure of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
to issue a patent within 3 years after the actual filing date 
 
72 Id at *1. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
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of the application under section 111(a) in the United 
States or, in the case of an international application, the 
date of commencement of the national stage under 
section 371 in the international application, not 
including: 
 
(i) any time consumed by continued 
examination of the application requested 
by the applicant under section 132(b).79  
 
Mayo contented it never “requested” an examination after the 
USPTO’s remand, and therefore a post-examination after 
interference was wrongfully attributed to Mayo’s request.80 Mayo 
read the statute as only allowing declaration of an interference if at 
least some claims are deemed allowable but for the outcome of the 
interference.81 On the other hand, the PTO contented that an 
interference does not close prosecution on the merits and that its 
operating procedures contemplate that examination may continue 
afterward.82  
 
On the first argument, the Federal Circuit agreed with the 
PTO.83 The Federal Circuit acknowledged Mayo’s idea that the 
PTO regulations do in fact indicate at least one claim in an 
application should be in condition for allowance prior to the 
declaration of an interference.84 However, the Federal Circuit noted 
that the regulations also grant the Board power to recommend any 
further action by the examiner, including issuing a rejection.85 The 
Court held that collectively, the PTO’s regulations do not indicate 
that a declaration of interference is equivalent to a Notice of 
Allowance.86  
 
79 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B)(i) 
80 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id at *12. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *12 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) 
11
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The Federal Circuit also commented on Mayo’s 
interpretation of the term “requested,” stating that 37 C.F.R. § 
1.703(b)(1) does not reflect an erroneous interpretation of the statute 
as Mayo accused.87 Rather, the Court believed Mayo placed too 
much weight on the term, which in fact does not bear much 
significance at all.88  
 
ii. Novartis framework 
 
Looking to the decision in Novartis v. AG Lee, Mayo argued 
that an allowance under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B) is analogous to a 
declaration of interference.89 Mayo contended that claims in a patent 
are otherwise “deemed allowable” by examiners before interference 
is declared.90 Specifically, Mayo meant that under USPTO 
regulations, a declaration of an interference comprises an indication 
of allowability and that examination concludes once the claims are 
“deemed allowable.”91 Using this framework, Mayo believed that 
because claims had to be deemed allowable in order to declare an 
interference, the post-interference proceedings were at the request 
of the examiner, because Mayo’s claims were already allowable 
prior to interference.92  
 
In response to the Novartis argument set forth by Mayo, the 
PTO claimed prosecution does not close simply due to a declaration 
of interference and further examination may continue after the 
fact.93 Using a policy standpoint, the PTO also expressed that if 
Mayo’s argument were allowed, PTA calculations would become 
“wildly impractical” and “hotly contested factual inquiry in nearly 
every PTA case.”94 
 
87 Id at *13. 
88 Id at *13-14. 
89 Id at *11. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
93 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *12 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
94 Id. 
12
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Again, the Federal Circuit sided with the PTO.95 Citing to 
its holding in Novartis, the Federal Circuit explains “[t]he time 
between the date of mailing of the Notice of Allowance and the 
issuance is not RCE time, absent special circumstances where 
examination is reopened after allowance, because examination of 
the merits closes upon allowance in the great majority of cases.”96 
Following the prosecution history, the PTO explained that the 
examiner for Mayo had the authority to update the prior art search 
upon remand and issue a rejection as it saw fit.97 Mayo then 
succeeded in its response to the examiner, which then secured 
allowance—not prior to interference as Mayo believes.98 However, 
the Court explains that following this timeline, it shows that 
examination ended once the Notice of Allowance was mailed—not 




The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the district 
court, holding the USPTO correctly determined there was no B 




In a dissent by Judge Newman, he stated his disagreement 
with the majority’s holding that post-interference examination 
period is not included in the patent term adjustment.101 Newman’s 
reasoning is reflected in his belief that the majority’s holding does 
 
95 Id at *12-13. 
96 Id at *13. 
97 Id. 
98 Id at *14. 
99 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *13 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
100 Id at *16. 
101 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *17 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J., 
dissenting). 
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not align with the statutory provisions and precedent regarding 
PTAs.102  
 
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s use of 37 C.F.R. § 
1.703(b)(1) as limiting the patent term adjustment after continued 
examination was requested.103 In agreement with Mayo’s argument, 
the dissent read that § 1.703(b)(1) “was adopted to establish that the 
period of examination ends with mailing of the notice of allowance; 
it has no relation to post-interference examination.”104  
 
The dissent argued the application of Novartis was 
erroneous, as the case did not relate to prosecution or activity prior 
to the Notice of Allowance.105 Rather, Novartis was “concerned 
only with the ‘time from allowance to issuance.’”106 Newman stated 
there was no dispute to whether the PTO had authority to reopen 
examination after the termination of interference; citing to MPEP § 
2308107, further examination, when there is no recommendation in 
the interference judgment, is at the initiative of the examiner.108  
 
Finally, the dissent pointed to Congressional intent of term 
adjustments. The intentions behind PTAs are to penalize only those 
who purposely manipulate the system, which does not apply in 
Mayo’s case.109 In terms of purpose, § 1.703(b)(1) requires 
 
102 Id. 
103 Id at *19. 
104 Id.  
105 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *21 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J., 
dissenting). 
106 Id. 
107 MPEP § 2308 
“If there is no recommendation in the judgment, the examiner should update the 
search and may, but is not required to, reopen prosecution for any claim not 
disposed of in the judgment. An interference judgment simply resolves any 
question of priority between the two parties to the interference. The judgment 
does not prevent the examiner from making a rejection in further examination in 
the same application or a different application.” 
108 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *22 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J., 
dissenting). 
109 Id at *24. 
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examination delay to be requested by the applicant, which is also 
not the case for Mayo.110 Therefore, the interference delay should 




A. Statutory Interpretation 
 
Mayo argues that the court’s reading of 37 C.F.R. § 
1.703(b)(1) misrepresents the meaning of RCE, as it is defined in 
the statute.112 Where 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B)(i) states that time 
consumed by continued examination requested by the applicant is 
not included in PTA time, Mayo argues that it did not “request” 
examination following the Board’s remand.113 37 C.F.R. § 
41.127(c) states that an interference judgment may include 
recommendations for further action by the examiner or the Board, 
and if the Board recommends rejection of a claim of an involved 
application, the examiner “must enter and maintain the 
recommended rejection...”114 Mayo’s interference proceedings did 
not contain any further recommendation actions by the Board.115 
The dissent used MPEP § 2308116 for guidance on when there is no 
further recommendations to be taken.117 In such instances, the 
“examiner should update the search and may, but is not required to, 
reopen prosecution for any claim not disposed of in the 
judgment.”118 Moreover, § 2308 interprets an interference as 
solving questions of priority between two parties; it does not prevent 
 
110 Id. 
111 Id at *24-25. 
112 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *22 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J., 
dissenting). 
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 See supra note 97. 
117 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
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an examiner from making rejections in further examination of the 
same application.119  
 
Using the MPEP as guidance, since no recommendation for 
further action was provided by the examiner during the interference, 
the language makes clear that the examiner should update the search 
but “[i]s not required to, reopen prosecution.”120 The decision to 
make further examinations is clearly given to the examiner.121 
Although Mayo requested the initial RCE, it did not ask for 
continued examination after the termination of interference.122 
Rather, the examiner chose to further examine the claim language 
of the ‘310 application for obviousness-type double patenting.123 
The majority made the argument that because Mayo made the initial 
request and that prosecution does not end until the mailing of the 
notice of allowance, that all time after interference is part of the 
RCE time and will not be allotted any PTA.124 Through this 
framework, the majority seems to believe that RCE is all 
encompassing and even includes examination of aspects that the 
applicant did not specifically ask for. The code of federal 
regulations and MPEP plainly set out the road map that post 
interference examination is a decision attributed to the examiner and 
is not encompassed in a continued examination request by the 
applicant.125  
 
B. Application of Novartis 
 
Both parties make strong arguments regarding when a claim 
is “deemed allowable” based on the holding of Novartis. The 
premise of Novartis was that examination ends at the notice of 





122 Id at *23. 
123 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *23 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J., 
dissenting). 
124 Id. 
125 Id at *22-23. 
126 Id at *21. 
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conclusion only settles the question in so far as disregarding time 
between the notice of allowance and the date of issuance, which is 
not at dispute in Mayo Foundation.127 As the majority also states in 
Mayo Foundation regarding Novartis, “[e]xamination as used in § 
154(b)(1)(B) ‘presumptively ends at allowance, when prosecution 
is closed and there is no further examination on the merits in the 
absence of a special reopening.”128 The majority’s reading of the 
Novartis case is correct. Novartis was concerned with when 
prosecution ends; it is clear that prosecution ends at the notice of 
allowance instead of the issue date.129 After a notice of allowance 
there are no longer any prosecution steps by the examiner; control 
of the patent leaves the hands of the examiner and goes into the 
hands of the publisher—therefore, it is presumed that prosecution 
ends at the notice of allowance.130 But it is important to consider, as 
the dissent points out, the case at hand is not regarding when 
prosecution ends.131 Rather, Mayo Foundation concerns when 
prosecution time attributed to fault of the applicant ends.132 
Specifically, the case at hand asks if post interference examination 
is a continuation of RCE at the expense of the applicant, or if it is a 
separate examination at the hands of the examiner.133 Although the 
reading of Novartis is correct, it is not correct in terms of Mayo’s 
issues. The dissent correctly argues that Novartis is not applicable 
in Mayo’s case because it was merely concerned with establishing 
the meaning of the time between the mailing of the Notice of 





129 Novartis AG v. Lee, 740 F.3d 593 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
130 Changes to Patent Term Adjustment in view of the Federal Circuit Decision 
in Novartis v. Lee, 80 Fed. Reg. 1346, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/01/09/2015-00061/changes-to-
patent-term-adjustment-in-view-of-the-federal-circuit-decision-in-novartis-v-lee  
131 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *21 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J., 
dissenting). 
132 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
133 Id. 
134 Id at *21. 
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C. Did the majority get it right? 
 
The majority’s firm opinion seems flawed. If the purpose of 
patent term adjustments is to compensate the patentee for delay 
caused by the USPTO during prosecution, then it should do so 
wholly. The dispute in Mayo Foundation is over 112 days-, yet the 
time taken to appeal the case took well over 100 days.135 PTA is 
compensated to patentees so long as there is no sense of misleading 
or deceiving the patent office.136 It was not disputed that Mayo did 
not try to deceive the patent office.137 During prosecution Mayo 
played by the rules and did just as the examiner asked every step of 
the way.138 It is counterintuitive, in light of the purpose behind 
obtaining a patent, for PTAs to penalize an applicant for abiding by 
the requests of the examiner but not being properly compensated for 
their efforts.  
 
Matters of this sort should be saved for the court in cases 
where a patentee is clearly attempting to take advantage of the 
patent office and term adjustments to their patent. In cases where no 
such deceit is in dispute, it would be better for the examiners, patent 
office, and courts to spend their time consulting issues of greater 
importance. Judgments such as the one the majority made here will 
only add reasons to dissuade people from applying for patents—the 




135 Footnote 1 in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. 
Iancu., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27771, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) indicates: 
“Both Mayo and the PTO have since change their PTA calculations...Mayo now 
claims 723 days, while the PTO has finally determined the Mayo is due 604 
days.”  
136 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *24 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019)(Newman, C.J., 
dissenting)(citing H.R. Rep. No. 106-287, pt. 1, at 49-50 (1999)).  
137 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *24 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J., 
dissenting). 
138 Id at *24. 
139 Joe Hadzima, Boston Business Journal, The Importance of Patents:  It Pays 
to Know Patent Rules, http://web.mit.edu/e-club/hadzima/the-importance-of-
patents.html  
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF MAYO ON DOUBLE PATENTING 
 
The primary focus of Mayo Foundation is the discrepancy 
of days calculated between Mayo and the PTO regarding delay time 
allotted for the patent term adjustment.140 Although the outcome of 
the case is focused on calculation of PTA days, the holding can have 
greater implications on patents, specifically regarding obviousness-
type double patenting.  
 
The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Novartis Pharms. 
Corp. v. Ezra Ventures LLC, shows how obviousness-type double 
patenting is affected by Patent Term Extensions (“PTE”).141 Ezra 
narrows the reach of OTDP by holding a PTE is valid “as long as 
the extended patent is otherwise valid without the extension.”142 The 
Novartis patent was granted PTE time due to FDA delays during the 
drug approval process.143 Novartis filed for infringement when Ezra 
attempted to market a generic version of the patented drug.144 The 
PTE for Novartis extended the patent’s term beyond that of a later-
filed patent claiming the treatment methods of using the drug’s 
active ingredients.145 In defense, Ezra claimed that OTDP cuts 
Novartis’ PTE time.146 The Court ultimately held that OTDP is a 
“judge-made doctrine” whose purpose is to prevent PTE beyond a 
statutory time limit.147 Since PTE is a statutorily defined concept, 
 
140 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
141 Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Ezra Ventures LLC, 909 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2018). 
142Jo Dale Carothers, The IP Blog, Federal Circuit Narrows Reach of 
Obviousness-Type Double Patenting (Dec. 20, 2018) 
https://www.theiplawblog.com/2018/12/articles/patent-law/federal-circuit-
narrows-reach-of-obviousness-type-double-patenting/  
143 Payal Majumdar, Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Does Not Invalidate 
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allowing OTDP to curtail PTE would be beyond the scope of 
purpose for obviousness-type double patenting.148 
 
Without prior knowledge or context, it is easy to assume that 
a patent term adjustment is equivalent to a patent term extension. 
The concepts are similar—they add additional time to the life of a 
patent that has been otherwise consumed by the prosecution 
process.149 A PTE is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 156 and is applicable 
when the patent applicant is responsible for prosecution delays.150 
On the contrary, a PTA is appropriate when an application has been 
delayed because of the USPTO.151  
 
Through cases like Ezra, and other recent decisions such as 
Gilead Sciences, Inc. v Natco Pharma Ltd.,152 the Federal Circuit 
has opened the scope of PTEs so that obviousness-type double 
patenting is not able to interfere with the life of a patent. However, 
courts have yet to determine how OTDP plays a role in cases with 
patent term adjustments rather than extensions. The basis of Ezra is 
that OTDP is a judge-made doctrine aimed at preventing a patent’s 
span beyond its “statutorily afforded term.”153 Since PTE is a 
 
148 Arpita Bchattcharyya, Timothy McAnulty, CIPA Journal Double Patenting 
(Jan. 2017). 
149 Thomas L. Irving, Jill K. MacAlpine, Charles E. Van Horn, Patent Term 
Adjustments and Extensions: Leveraging Recent Decisions and USPTO Rule 
Changes (Oct. 11, 2018). http://media.straffordpub.com/products/patent-term-
adjustments-and-extensions-leveraging-recent-decisions-and-uspto-rule-
changes-2018-10-11/presentation.pdf  
150 35 U.S.C. § 156. 
(a)The term of a patent which claims a product, a method of using a product, or 
a method of manufacturing a product shall be extended in accordance with this 
section from the original expiration date of the patent, which shall include any 
patent term adjustment granted under section 154(b), if—  
151 Thomas L. Irving, Jill K. MacAlpine, Charles E. Van Horn, Patent Term 
Adjustments and Extensions: Leveraging Recent Decisions and USPTO Rule 
Changes (Oct. 11, 2018). http://media.straffordpub.com/products/patent-term-
adjustments-and-extensions-leveraging-recent-decisions-and-uspto-rule-
changes-2018-10-11/presentation.pdf  
152 Gilead Sciences, Inc. v Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
153 Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Ezra Ventures LLC, 909 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2018). 
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statutory concept, it therefore cannot be invalidated using OTDP.154 
On the same note, it could be presumed that future case holdings 
regarding PTAs will align with the Ezra outcome as well. If future 
courts stay in line with Ezra, the idea of OTDP will immensely 
change patent law. From the perspective of a patent applicant, they 
will be afforded greater protection and longer rights to their family 
of patents, by being able to claim virtually the same claims with just 
a few slight changes, to extend the life of that patent. On the flipside, 
applying the Ezra reasoning works against the purpose of having a 
patent: establishing a 20 year monopoly but then allowing the rest 
of the market a chance to benefit off the claimed ideas and 
concepts.155 The narrowing framework of disallowing OTDP to 
curtail a statutory adjustment is beneficial to the patent applicants 
and potentially very harmful to future American innovators.  
 
The statutory language of section 156 states that the term of 
the patent “shall be extended...from the original expiration date of 
the patent, which shall include any patent term adjustment granted 
under section 154(b)...”156 (emphasis added). A literal reading of the 
statute indicates that a patent term adjustment is included in a patent 
term extension. Although the issue of ODTP has not been addressed 
in courts as it pertains to PTAs, it could be implied through section 
156 that because PTAs are included in PTE calculations—and PTAs 
are also a statutory doctrine—that their treatment in regards to 
ODTP should resemble that of PTEs. In Gilead, the court held that 
the expiration date of the patents should be looked at to determine 
an ODTP reference and how to overcome it.157 If a PTA is thus 
treated like a PTE in regard to double patenting rejections, this 
means that an applicant will be allotted the additional PTA days 
owed by the USPTO regardless. Applying the limiting ODTP 
results from Ezra, an application requiring PTA will be able to 
continue its life without worrying about a non-statutory double 
patenting rejection.  
 
154 Id. 
155 James Yang, OC Patent Lawyer Purpose of the patent system (April 11, 
2018) https://ocpatentlawyer.com/lesson/purpose-benefits-patent-system/ 
156 See supra note 139. 
157 Gilead Sciences, Inc. v Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
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Since cases of PTAs and obviousness-type double patenting 
have not been litigated, it is still up in the air as to how a court would 
rule on this type of matter.158 A court could treat it like Ezra and 
Gilead, such as the scenario described above. On the other hand, a 
court could also decide to not apply the narrowing scope of Ezra to 




The holding in Mayo Foundation conveys that if an 
interference was declared during prosecution, even without the 
request of the applicant, the applicant is responsible for the delay 
time.159 The outcome of Mayo Foundation penalizes applicants for 
the prosecution process in which interference was due to the 
examiner. Although the majority explained the Novartis case 
correctly, it failed to properly apply the case to the matter at hand. 
The question surrounding Novartis was profoundly different than 
the one faced in Mayo Foundation.160 While Novartis focused on 
the expiration of a patent at either the notice of allowance or date of 
issuance, Mayo Foundation’s question relied on the determination 
of post interference delay and who (applicant or examiner) is 
responsible for the delay.161 The dissent correctly argued that the 
post interference delay in Mayo Foundation was at the fault of the 
examiner and not Mayo. The examiner had the right to open 
examination after the expiration of interference but was not required 
to do so.162 Thus, it only seems logical that the post interference 
 
158 Payal Majumdar, Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Does Not Invalidate 
Patent Term Extensions (Feb. 1, 2019) 
https://oshaliang.com/uncategorized/obviousness-type-double-patenting-does-
not-invalidate-patent-term-extensions/ 
159 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019). 
160 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27771, at *21 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J., 
dissenting). 
161 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. 
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proceedings were at the discretion of the examiner. Mayo followed 
all the steps requested by the examiner, and at no point attempted to 
deceive the patent office.163 Yet, in the end, was punished for 
following the rules.164 The majority’s opinion shifts focus from the 
purpose of granting patents and instead places additional roadblocks 
in front of applicants.  
 
The dispute over a few months delay seems trivial in light 
of the fact that patents have a 20-year life span. Although the Mayo 
PTA dispute did not involve a significant amount of time, each day 
is crucial for the patent applicant. The lifespan of a patent can affect 
other patents within the family of patents.165 Regarding OTDP, 
there have been no cases that rule on PTAs.166 However, if courts 
take the same approach to OTDP in patent term adjustments, as they 
did for patent term extensions in Novartis v. Ezra, it becomes crucial 
to properly calculate the delay days returned to the patent. If, 
however, a court does not apply the Ezra reasoning associated with 
PTEs to PTA circumstances, such as what is presented in Mayo 
Foundation, there will still be implications. Obtaining a patent is 
already a cumbersome and timely process.167 The additional 
challenge of worrying over lost time caused by the examiner, but 
taken at the expense of the applicant, only hinders the process and 
purpose of obtaining a patent. The overall purpose of obtaining an 
exclusive right is to promote innovation.168 This purpose cannot be 
upheld if the focus of courts remains on such small matters between 
an applicant and the examiner. Depending on the patent’s timeline, 




165 Elizabeth A. Doherty, Amelia Feulner Baur, Navigating through the 
Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Minefield (Jan. 2018). 
166 Payal Majumdar, Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Does Not Invalidate 
Patent Term Extensions (Feb. 1, 2019) 
https://oshaliang.com/uncategorized/obviousness-type-double-patenting-does-
not-invalidate-patent-term-extensions/ 
167 IP Spotlight: How long does it take to get a patent or trademark? (2018 
Update) (Jan 11, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/how-long-does-it-
take-to-get-a-patent-21821/ 
168 James Yang, OC Patent Lawyer Purpose of the patent system (April 11, 
2018) https://ocpatentlawyer.com/lesson/purpose-benefits-patent-system/  
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from the patentee, to protect related patents within the family and 
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